

Fides: Secure and Scalable Asynchronous DAG Consensus via Trusted Components

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
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
BFT Consensus

Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) Consensus allows a distributed system to reach agreement among replicas despite Byzantine failure (e.g., malicious attack).




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Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) Consensus allows a distributed system to reach agreement among replicas despite **Byzantine failure** (e.g., malicious attack).



Leader-based BFT^[1]


Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (**PBFT**) protocol



[1] Miguel Castro and Barbara Liskov. Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance. In OSDI, 1999.

Leader-based BFT^[1]

Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) protocol



Check leader's equivocation

A Byzantine leader may lie.




1. **Equivocation Cross-checking:**
One additional msg phase.

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Leader-based BFT^[1]

Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) protocol



m: metadata (~100B)

t: payload (~500KB)

size(t) >> *size(m)*
Load Imbalance!



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
1. **Equivocation Cross-checking:**
One additional msg phase.
2. **Leader Bottleneck:** leader is too busy while others are idling.

[1] Miguel Castro and Barbara Liskov. Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance. In OSDI, 1999.

Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)

A TEE creates a small trusted island inside an untrusted replica.

1. Hardware isolation; 2. Remote attestation; 3. Verifiable outputs



TEE addresses 1. Equivocation Cross-checking

PBFT normal path

3 phases · $3f + 1$ replicas




Why three phases?

PREPARE cross-check → COMMIT across views

Replicas must cross-check a primary that may equivocate

MinBFT normal path

2 phases · $2f + 1$ replicas



What changes with a TEE?

TEE sequence → No equivocation

No separate all-to-all PREPARE echo

TEE brings: 1. One less phase; 2. Higher fault tolerance ($f < n/3 \rightarrow f < n/2$).

[1] Miguel Castro and Barbara Liskov. Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance. In OSDI, 1999.


[2] Giuliana Santos Veronese et al. Efficient Byzantine Fault-Tolerance. In IEEE Trans. on Computers, 2013.

DAG-based BFT addresses 2. Leader Bottleneck

Problems of PBFT/MinBFT: All workload is relied on **one single leader**.

Core Idea:

1. All replicas propose concurrently and link proposals into a DAG.
2. A leader is selected in each *wave* to derive a consistent commit order.



DAG-based BFT addresses 2. Leader Bottleneck


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Can we combine TEE and DAG to scale BFT?




Observation

TEE involves some **crypto overhead**, so we leverage minimal TEE to scale the system (**minimal TCB**): three *tiny* (**<1% LOC**) trusted components:

Observation


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Overview


Fides integrates the TEE into the DAG workflow.

1. **Dissemination:** *RAC* certifies validity of DAG;
MC ensures replicas can not send conflict msgs.
2. **DAG Construction:** Replicas verify received vertices and link them into their local DAGs.
3. **Ordering:** *RNG* selects a shared leader and commit the transactions.




Challenges & Solution

Traditional DAG · 7 replicas




Reduced-quorum DAG (Fides) · 5 replicas



Traditional DAG

$$n = 3f + 1$$

$$2f + 1 \text{ parents}$$



$$|P(A) \cap P(B)| \geq f + 1$$

T-RBC

fault threshold

$$f < n/3 \rightarrow f < n/2$$




fewer parents

example: $f = 2$

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Higher fault tolerance




Less proportion of
honest replicas




Less intersection
between references

Challenges & Solution

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
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
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Weaker DAG connectivity

adversarial scheduling




support disperses




2-ROUND RULE CAN STALL

Challenges & Solution

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
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Weaker DAG connectivity



adversarial scheduling

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2-ROUND RULE CAN STALL

FIDES SOLUTION

4-round commit rule

Evaluation Setting

Testbed:

- Alibaba Cloud, g6(t).xlarge
- 4vCPUs and 16GB RAM Ubuntu Linux 22.04
- Deployed both in LAN and WAN
- 50-Byte random KV insertions.

Selected Research Questions:

- How does Fides **scale** compared with state-of-the-art BFT protocols?
- How much does each **trusted component** contribute to Fides' performance?
- How **resilient** is Fides under adversarial conditions?

Baseline protocols:

- DAG: Tusk^[1]
Bullshark^[2]
Mysticeti^[3]
Shoal++^[4]
- Multi-BFT: RCC^[5]
- TEE-BFT: Damysus^[6]
Achilles^[7]
HybridSet^[8]

[1] Danezis et al. Narwhal and Tusk: A DAG-Based Mempool and Efficient BFT Consensus, in ACM EuroSys'22.

[2] Spiegelman et al. Bullshark: DAG BFT Protocols Made Practical, in ACM CCS'22.

[3] Babel et al. Mysticeti: Reaching the Latency Limits with Uncertified DAGs, in NDSS'25.

[4] Arun et al. Shoal++: High Throughput DAG BFT Can Be Fast and Robust!, in USENIX NSDI'25.


[5] Gupta et al. RCC: Resilient Concurrent Consensus for High-Throughput Secure Transaction Processing, in IEEE ICDE'21.

[6] Decouchant et al. DAMYSUS: Streamlined BFT Consensus Leveraging Trusted Components, in ACM EuroSys'22.

[7] Niu et al. Achilles: Efficient TEE-Assisted BFT Consensus via Rollback Resilient Recovery, in ACM EuroSys'25.



[8] Zhao et al. Trusted Hardware-Assisted Leaderless Byzantine Fault Tolerance Consensus (HybridSet), in IEEE TDSC'24.

Scalability of Fides and other baselines



- f from 2 to 20
- **WAN:** United States, UAE, Singapore, and Germany
- $>4\times$ throughput of Tusk
- $\approx 35\%$ above the closest DAG baselines

Ablation Study for Trusted Components




- $f = 10$
- MC provides the largest individual gain, with RAC and RNG adding further improvements.


Adversarial Experiments



(n) Byzantine Attack



(o) Adversarial Network



- $f = 10$
- *Byzantine Attack*
- *Selective Delivery*
- *Network Jitter*
- 10% - 90%

Contributions

Fides: the first **DAG-based & TEE-assisted** BFT protocol

- Tolerates $f < n/2$ Byzantine replicas.
- Scales the system with 3 *tiny* trusted components.
- Identifies liveness violation and provides solution.



$$n = 2f + 1$$

Tolerates f Byzantine replicas
with a smaller replica set

Minimal TCB

MC RAC RNG

MC · RAC · RNG

Scales the DAG with three
tiny trusted components

$k = 2$ ○—○

$S^*(2) = \emptyset$
no liveness

$k = 3$ ○—○—○

$|S^*(3)| = 2$
 $\Theta(f)$ expected latency

FIDES

$k = 4$ ○—○—○—○

$|S^*(4)| \geq f+1$
 ≤ 8 expected rounds

Optimal four-round rule

Solves reduced-quorum liveness
with constant expected latency

Code:

